This article forms part of ATB Legal’s analysis of foreign arbitral award enforcement in India and the UAE.
In short: Indian courts will not reopen a foreign award’s merits. Enforcement may be refused only for a proven flaw in capacity, validity of the arbitration agreement, procedural fairness, tribunal authority or composition, or award status.
Winning an arbitration is one thing. Getting paid is another.
Take a hypothetical. A resin supplier in Sharjah has spent two years pursuing a packaging company in Pune over unpaid shipments. A Singapore-seated arbitral tribunal rules in favour of the supplier and orders the Pune-based company to pay the outstanding invoices, together with interest.
The Pune-based company does not pay, and everything it owns is in India. So, the supplier asks an Indian High Court to enforce the award. How a foreign award qualifies for that route is explained in Introduction to Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in India.
The buyer’s response is not a neatly organised list of objections. Its challenges span several pages and overlap. It says the arbitrators misread the contract. It questions whether it ever validly agreed to arbitrate. It complains that a late expert report left it no fair chance to reply, and that one arbitrator was appointed outside the procedure in the clause. It says part of the interest relates to a different contract altogether. And it has applied to the Singapore courts to set the award aside.
For the supplier’s board, the question is simple: can any of this stop the recovery?
Indian law makes an important distinction here. An enforcement court is not a second tribunal. Under section 48(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the buyer must prove one of five specific grounds before enforcement can be refused. The question is no longer whether the tribunal reached the right commercial answer. It is whether something went wrong with the agreement, the hearing, the tribunal’s authority or the legal status of the award. Public policy and arbitrability, the remaining grounds in section 48(2), are discussed separately in Public Policy and Arbitrability: Foreign Awards in India.
Key points at a glance
| Issue | Position | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Who must prove a ground | The party resisting enforcement | s. 48(1); Vijay Karia (SC, 2020), para 45 |
| Merits review | Not permitted; grounds read narrowly | Gemini Bay (SC, 2021), para 40 |
| (a) Incapacity or invalid agreement | Capacity under the law applicable to the party; validity under the law the parties chose or, failing that, the law where the award was made | s. 48(1)(a) |
| (b) Notice and fair hearing | Concerns the fairness of the hearing, not the award’s reasoning | s. 48(1)(b) |
| (c) Beyond the submission | Separable decisions within the submission may still be enforced | s. 48(1)(c) and proviso |
| (d) Tribunal and procedure | Tested first against the parties’ agreement; the seat’s law applies where there is no agreement | s. 48(1)(d) |
| (e) Award not binding, set aside or suspended | Status is judged under the seat’s law | s. 48(1)(e) |
| Pending challenge at the seat | Court may adjourn and may order security; neither is automatic | s. 48(3) |
Narrow Review: The Burden Under Section 48(1)
A losing party’s strongest objection will be that the tribunal got it wrong. However, in India, it carries the least weight.
Section 48(1) allows refusal only “at the request of the party against whom it is invoked”, and only if that party “furnishes to the court proof” of a listed ground. The supplier does not have to defend the award’s reasoning. In Vijay Karia v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL , AIR 2020 SC 1807, the Supreme Court confirmed that the burden lies on the party objecting (para 45). It held that a foreign award cannot be impeached on its merits at enforcement (para 37), or refused by second-guessing the arbitrator’s reading of the contract (para 45).
The Court went further in Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt Ltd v Integrated Sales Service Ltd , AIR 2021 SC 3836. The grounds “are not to be construed expansively but narrowly”, and if none is made out, “the foreign award must be enforced” (para 40). Patent illegality and perversity, which can matter for some Indian-seated awards under Section 34, are not independent grounds for refusing enforcement of a foreign award here (Vijay Karia, para 38; Gemini Bay, paras 58–59).
So, the buyer’s complaint about the contract drops away. The arbitral process, however, remains subject to scrutiny. A company may argue that the clause never bound it, or that it was shut out of the hearing. Those objections go to the legitimacy of the process, not the correctness of the result.
Invalid Agreement: Section 48(1)(a)
The first of those objections asks whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate at all. Section 48(1)(a) allows refusal if a party was under some incapacity under the law that applies to it, or if the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law the parties chose for it. Where they made no choice, the test is the law of the juridical seat of arbitration.
The validity test is whether the arbitration agreement was legally valid under the applicable law, including whether the person who signed it had authority to bind the party and whether the party’s consent to arbitrate was legally effective. Capacity is a separate limb, tested under the law applicable to the party itself. The inquiry concerns the arbitration agreement itself, not whether the underlying contract was properly performed. For the Pune company, this means that complaints about late, short or defective resin shipments cannot be used to resist enforcement under this ground. Those are disputes under the supply contract, and they were for the Singapore-seated tribunal to decide. To succeed under section 48(1)(a), the company must show that the agreement to arbitrate itself was invalid, for example because the person who signed it had no authority to bind the company. Even then, lack of authority does not automatically establish an invalid arbitration agreement: under the applicable law the company may, for instance, have ratified the signature or otherwise become bound by it. Capacity, authority and consent each require separate analysis.
Objections by parties that never signed the arbitration agreement raise a different question again, and here too the ground is read closely. In Gemini Bay, enforcement was resisted by parties that had not signed the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court held that their objection was “outside the literal construction of Section 48(1)(a)” (para 42) and could not be brought within it (para 49). It left open whether a non-signatory might raise a different objection under section 48(2) in an appropriate case (para 49).
Fair Hearing: Section 48(1)(b)
The buyer’s complaint about the expert report deserves more attention, because it raises the kind of objection that may have substance.
Section 48(1)(b) allows refusal where the resisting party was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case. In Vijay Karia, the Supreme Court confined the inquiry to the fairness of the arbitral hearing, recognising that a party may be denied a fair opportunity to present its case by matters outside its control.
A late report does not, by itself, make an arbitration unfair. The key question is whether the buyer had a meaningful opportunity to respond. Suppose the report was served shortly before the hearing, the buyer sought additional time to address it and the tribunal refused that request. If the tribunal then relied on that report to decide a central issue, the objection would warrant serious consideration. The position is very different if the buyer received the report in time, filed a reply and simply lost the argument.
The answer therefore lies in the procedural record: when the report was served, whether an extension was sought, what the tribunal ruled on that request and how the report was considered at the hearing. Section 48(1)(b) protects the party’s opportunity to present its case, not the outcome of it. An adverse procedural ruling, a refused adjournment, a rejected document request or a tight timetable, is not in itself a denial of the opportunity to present a case. The question is whether, in substance, the party was prevented from putting its case on a material issue.
Courts have applied the ground narrowly. In Shin-Etsu Chemical Co Ltd v Sterlite Technologies Ltd, 5 June 2023 (2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1089), the court rejected a section 48(1)(b) objection and held the Singapore-seated ICC award enforceable. A complaint that a tribunal failed to decide an entire claim raises a different question, taken up in the public policy article.
Excess of Mandate: Section 48(1)(c)
The interest point is narrower, but it is also the objection most likely to affect the amount recovered, and less likely to affect whether anything is recovered.
Section 48(1)(c) covers an award that deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. In Gemini Bay, the Supreme Court described it as dealing “only” with disputes outside the scope of the arbitration agreement (para 60).
A proviso softens the effect. Where decisions on matters submitted can be separated from those that were not, the part within the submission may still be enforced. Thus, if the disputed interest does relate to a matter outside the tribunal’s mandate, the court may enforce the remainder of the award, provided the two parts can be separated.
Whether partial enforcement is possible will often depend on how the award is drafted. If the award specifies separate figures for the unpaid invoices and the disputed interest, the exercise may be relatively straightforward. If it states only a single, undivided sum, separating the enforceable portion becomes harder.
Tribunal Appointment: Section 48(1)(d)
Objections to the composition of an arbitral tribunal often arise at the enforcement stage, but the timing of the objection may be decisive. Section 48(1)(d) permits refusal where the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place. The parties’ agreement therefore comes first; the law of the seat is the yardstick only where there is no agreement on the point. Unlike Section 34(2)(a)(v), which applies to Indian-seated awards, Section 48(1)(d) does not expressly address a situation where the parties’ agreed procedure conflicts with a mandatory provision of the law of the arbitral seat. The decisions discussed here do not resolve that question.
In Mercator Ltd v Dredging Corporation of India Ltd, (Delhi High Court, 30 April 2024), the award debtor challenged the tribunal’s composition only when enforcement began. It had not objected during the appointment process or before the courts at the seat. One of the arbitrators had also been its own nominee. Under these circumstances, the court treated the objection as an afterthought and did not refuse enforcement on that ground (paras 16–19).
Section 48(1)(d) asks whether the tribunal was constituted and the arbitration conducted in accordance with the parties’ agreement or, in the absence of such agreement, the law of the arbitral seat. A complaint that an arbitrator was biased, or failed to disclose a conflict, is a different objection. The Indian courts have dealt with it as a matter of public policy under section 48(2)(b), not under section 48(1)(d), and such complaints have sometimes succeeded. That line of authority is discussed in our public policy article.
The relevant record includes the arbitration clause, the correspondence concerning the appointment of arbitrators and any objection raised by the buyer at the time. An objection raised promptly and consistently pursued throughout the proceedings stands on a different footing from one raised for the first time during enforcement proceedings in India.
Seat Challenges: Section 48(1)(e) and Section 48(3)
Suppose the agreement was valid, both sides were fairly heard, the tribunal was properly constituted and the award remained within its mandate. One question remains: is the award binding, and has it been set aside or suspended at the seat? The question becomes particularly important when the buyer has challenged the award before the courts at the seat of arbitration in Singapore.
Section 48(1)(e) provides three grounds for refusing enforcement: the award has not yet become binding on the parties, has been set aside, or has been suspended by a competent authority in the country in which, or under the law of which, the award was made.
The relevant authority is the court having jurisdiction at the seat of the arbitration. In Noy Vallesina Engineering SpA v Jindal Drugs Ltd, 2020 INSC 659, the Court read “under the law of which” as the procedural law of the arbitration, not the law of the contract (para 10).
The mere pendency of an application to set aside an award does not mean that the award has been set aside. Whether the award is binding while the application is heard depends on the law of the seat.
The position changes once the seat court has ruled. If the challenge at the seat fails, the award debtor may find that issues the seat court decided against it cannot be argued again in India. Whether they can depends on the requirements of issue estoppel: a final decision of a competent court, between the same parties, on the same issue, after full contest. The leading Indian authorities on that question arose in public-policy challenges and are discussed in our public policy article.
The pending challenge may nevertheless slow things down in India. Under section 48(3), the Indian court may adjourn its decision, while an application to set aside or suspend the award is pending before a competent authority. On the award holder’s application, the court may also require the award debtor to provide appropriate security. How these applications are made is covered in Enforcing a Foreign Arbitral Award in India: Step by Step.
What Refusal Means in India
Even if one of the buyer’s objections succeeds, a refusal of enforcement in India does not ordinarily annul the award. In Noy Vallesina, the Supreme Court held that a setting-aside challenge under section 34 did not lie against a London-seated award (paras 21–23). A refusal of enforcement under section 48 operates in India and does not, by itself, prevent the award from being enforced against assets in another jurisdiction. An award that has already been set aside at the seat is in a different position: that is itself a ground for refusal under section 48(1)(e), and courts elsewhere may take the same view.
Nor does a proven ground always lead to refusal. Section 48(1) says enforcement “may” be refused, and the courts treat that word with care. In Vijay Karia, the Supreme Court distinguished grounds that concern only the parties’ own interests from jurisdictional defects and public-policy violations. For the first group, a court may enforce despite a proven ground, for instance where the objection was waived or abandoned, or caused no prejudice (para 53-54). The Delhi High Court in Mercator also referred to the court’s discretion to decline enforcement (para 28).
Finally, objections are expected to come together. In LMJ International Ltd v Sleepwell Industries Co Ltd, 2019 INSC 241 the debtor had already lost its objections to the execution petitions, and its challenges to that order had failed (para 5). When it raised fresh objections to enforceability, the Court held that section 48 “does not envisage piecemeal consideration” and that the new objections were barred by constructive res judicata (para 14).
Weighing the Objections
Seen from the supplier’s side, the buyer’s objections carry very different levels of risk. The complaint about the contract does not engage section 48(1) at all. The challenge to the clause and the fair-hearing complaint could defeat enforcement entirely, but both turn on documents and the procedural record rather than on argument. The interest point puts part of the award at risk, depending on whether it can be separated from the rest. The objection to the tribunal’s appointment is weighed against the clause and against what the buyer did at the time. The Singapore application is a source of delay, and becomes more than that only if a Singapore court acts on it.
For the buyer, the same analysis shows where its leverage lies. Objections about notice, the hearing and the tribunal carry most weight when raised during the arbitration, an attack on the award itself belongs at the seat, and a second round of objections is unlikely to be heard.
What happens after a court enforces the award is covered in Recovering on a Foreign Arbitral Award in India. Awards from UAE seats are discussed in Can a UAE, DIFC or ADGM Award Be Enforced in India?, and the UAE courts’ approach to the same questions in When UAE Courts Refuse to Enforce a Foreign Arbitral Award.
FAQs
What are the grounds for refusing enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in India under section 48(1)?
There are five: (a) incapacity of a party or an invalid arbitration agreement; (b) lack of proper notice or inability to present one’s case; (c) an award beyond the scope of the submission; (d) a tribunal or procedure not in line with the parties’ agreement or, failing such agreement, the seat’s law; and (e) an award not yet binding, or set aside or suspended at the seat.
Who has to prove a section 48(1) ground when a foreign arbitral award is enforced in India?
The party resisting enforcement. Section 48(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 allows refusal only if the party against whom it is invoked furnishes proof of a listed ground. The Supreme Court confirmed in Vijay Karia v Prysmian Cavi (2020) that the burden lies on the objecting party.
Can an Indian court enforce only part of a foreign arbitral award?
Yes. Under the situation covered by the proviso to section 48(1)(c), where decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from decisions on matters not submitted, the part within the submission may be enforced. Whether separation is possible depends on how the award is structured.
How is section 48(1) different from section 48(2) for foreign arbitral awards in India?
Section 48(1) grounds must be raised and proved by the resisting party, and concern the agreement, notice, scope, tribunal and status of the award. Section 48(2) covers non-arbitrability and public policy, and turns on what the court finds. Section 48(2) is examined separately in this series.
Does a challenge pending at the seat stop enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in India?
Not automatically. Under section 48(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Indian court may adjourn its decision while a set-aside or suspension application is pending at the seat, and may order security on the award holder’s application.
Part of ATB Legal’s Dispute Resolution practice.