The year 2025 has witnessed several significant judgments by the Supreme Court, NCLAT, and NCLT that have shaped the evolving jurisprudence under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). These rulings have clarified critical aspects of the Code, ranging from the scope of judicial interference under Article 226, the sanctity of statutory timelines, the rights of operational creditors, to the balance between regulatory statutes such as the PMLA and the IBC framework. Collectively, they reinforce the principle that the IBC is a self-contained and time-bound code, designed to ensure certainty, discipline, and fairness in insolvency resolution while preventing procedural technicalities from defeating substantive justice. The following compilation highlights some of the most notable judgments delivered in 2025.
Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v Girish Sriram Juneja (civil appeal no 6071 of 2023)
In a 2:1 majority Judgement on 29 January 2025, a three-judge Bench of the Court relied on a plain reading of the IBC to conclude that the provision calling for approval of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) before submitting a resolution plan to the Committee of Creditors (CoC) was mandatory and not directory in Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v Girish Sriram Juneja.
The case stems from the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of Hindustan National Glass and Industries Ltd. (HNGIL), a leading company in the glass packaging sector. AGI Greenpac Ltd., the industry’s second-largest player, submitted a resolution plan that would create substantial market consolidation. The Resolution Professional allowed AGI’s plan to move forward without prior approval from the Competition Commission of India (CCI), which was contested by Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. (INSCO), another bidder. INSCO argued that under Section 31(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), CCI clearance is mandatory before the Committee of Creditors (CoC) can approve a plan. Both the NCLT and NCLAT rejected this contention, holding the requirement to be directory, not mandatory. INSCO has now appealed this interpretation before the Supreme Court.
- Whether CCI’s approval for a proposed combination under a resolution plan must mandatorily precede the approval of the resolution plan by CoC under Section 31(4) of the IBC.
- Whether failure to obtain prior CCI approval renders the resolution process invalid.
The Court ruled in favour of INSCO, holding that the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC is mandatory. Since the statutory language was clear and unambiguous, the Bench rejected the need for purposive interpretation and applied a literal reading. It reasoned that the legislature intended CCI approval to be obtained before a resolution plan is placed before the CoC, as the CCI may approve, reject, or modify proposed combinations. Referring to the proviso, the Court stressed that the term “prior” carries a definite legal meaning and must be given full effect.
This blog is a part of our The Complete Guide to NCLT in India: Powers, Structure, and Jurisdiction Blogpost.
The Court also noted that the IBC does not override competition law, and the requirement of obtaining CCI approval within its timelines must be accounted for in the CIRP process. Without such prior approval, there is a risk that the CoC may approve a resolution plan which fails to satisfy the requirements of the Competition Act, thereby rendering the entire CIRP exercise futile. To prevent this outcome, obtaining prior approval of the CCI is mandatory.
Mohammed Enterprises (Tanzania) Ltd. Vs. Farooq Ali Khan & Ors. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 23), dated January 3, 2025
In this case the Supreme Court delivered a significant judgment reinforcing the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), as a comprehensive legal framework for resolving corporate insolvencies. The court categorically held that High Courts must exercise extreme caution when entertaining writ petitions under Article 226 in matters governed by the IBC.
The Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against Associate Decor Ltd. (the “Corporate Debtor”) was initiated on October 26, 2018, upon an application filed by Oriental Bank of Commerce. During the CIRP, Mohammed Enterprises (Tanzania) Ltd. (METL) submitted a resolution plan, which was unanimously approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) on February 11, 2020. Respondent No. 1, a suspended director of the Corporate Debtor, challenged the approval of the plan, alleging procedural irregularities, particularly the failure to provide the mandatory 24-hour notice before the CoC meeting. Nearly three years later, on January 4, 2023, the suspended director approached the Karnataka High Court by way of a writ petition, seeking to set aside the resolution plan. The High Court entertained the petition and annulled the CoC-approved plan, holding that the lapse amounted to a violation of natural justice. Aggrieved, METL approached the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court’s interference was unjustified given the existence of comprehensive statutory remedies under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The appeal thus squarely raised the issue of whether the High Court could exercise writ jurisdiction in such matters despite alternate remedies being available under the IBC framework.
The key issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Karnataka High Court was justified in invoking its supervisory and judicial review powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Allowing the appeals, the Court held that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) is a self-contained code with adequate checks, safeguards, and appellate mechanisms. It emphasized that strict adherence to the procedures under the IBC is essential to maintain legal discipline and balance between order and justice. The Court also reaffirmed principles laid down in earlier judgments, including Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar (2019) and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021), cautioning against unwarranted judicial interference that could undermine the IBC framework. Ultimately, the Court underscored that the IBC’s core objective of achieving a time-bound insolvency resolution process must be not be hindered and be free from extraneous interventions.
Kalyani Transco v. M/s Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. & Ors Civil Appeal No. 1808 of 2020
This case deals with the corporate insolvency resolution process (the “CIRP”) of BPSL initiated by Punjab National Bank. several resolution plans were considered, and the Committee of Creditors (CoC) ultimately approved the plan submitted by JSW. The NCLT sanctioned the plan but imposed conditions, including compliance with Section 30(2) of the IBC, ensuring pending criminal proceedings against the former management would not affect plan implementation, and distributing CIRP profits in line with the Essar Steel judgment. Shortly after, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) attached BPSL’s assets under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. JSW appealed to the NCLAT, which removed NCLT’s conditions and, invoking Section 32A of the IBC, barred ED from attaching assets once the resolution plan had been approved. Subsequently, operational creditors, former promoters, and the State of Odisha sought cancellation of the plan and liquidation before the Supreme Court, while ED separately appealed against NCLAT’s order. Although the SC proceedings dragged on for over five years, the Resolution Plan was implemented by JSW by making payment to the financial creditors in 2021 and to the operational creditors in 2022.
In its judgment dated May 2, 2025, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of both the NCLT and NCLAT, declaring the resolution plan invalid for non-compliance with the IBC. It directed the NCLT to commence liquidation of BPSL under Chapter III of the Code, holding that Section 32A cannot be invoked to justify either non-implementation or prolonged delays in implementing a resolution plan. The Court further ordered that all payments made by JSW to creditors during the pendency of appeals be refunded.
Key findings of the Court included:
- The resolution professional and CoC failed to conclude the CIRP within the 270-day limit under Section 12 of the IBC, and any plan approved beyond this statutory period is legally unsustainable.
- Section 30(2) safeguards the rights of operational creditors, and any violation—through underpayment, dilution of priority, or improper approval—renders a resolution plan unlawful.
- JSW was found to have abused the process by delaying implementation for over two years, making misrepresentations, and unjustly benefiting by avoiding upfront payments promised under the plan.
- The NCLAT exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the ED’s asset attachment under the PMLA, a matter falling outside the scope of the IBC.
Indian Bank v. M/s Aman Hospitality Pvt. Ltd., Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 569 of 2025, decided on 7 August 2025
In this case the NCLAT principal bench, New Delhi addressed the issue of whether a power of attorney (POA) executed by officers nominated by their designation rather than by name could be treated as valid. The judgment clarifies the law on corporate authorisation and rebukes overly technical objections that risk obstructing justice in insolvency proceedings.
The case arose from an appeal filed by Indian Bank, as a financial creditor under Section 7 IBC application before the NCLT, New Delhi, against M/s Aman Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. In the course of proceedings, the Bank sought to amend Part IV of Form-1 through I.A. No. 4394 of 2024, aiming to correct and expand details of the debt. However, on 25 March 2025, the NCLT dismissed the application, not on merits but on maintainability. It ruled that the Bank’s Chief Manager, Shri Navjeet Nirala, lacked valid authority, as the Power of Attorney under which he acted had been executed by the General Manager and Deputy General Manager, who were not specifically empowered by the Bank’s Board. Challenging this finding, Indian Bank filed an appeal before the NCLAT.
The central issue before the NCLAT was whether execution of the POA under the Bank’s internal authorisation structure by officers nominated by designation (rather than by name) is legally valid and whether the NCLT erred in dismissing the amendment application without examining it on merits.
The bench noted that a plain reading of the Board Resolution showed that authority was vested in the Chairman and Executive Director to nominate officers competent to issue a power of attorney. In exercise of this authority, the General Manager and Deputy General Manager were designated to execute such instruments. It was not necessary that nominations be made by individual names; specifying office designations provided continuity, as the authority would vest in whoever occupied those posts from time to time. Accordingly, the POA executed in 2023 in favour of Shri Nirala was held valid.
The Tribunal further observed that the law recognises delegation by office as equivalent to delegation by name, since corporations and banks function as continuing institutions with changing incumbents. It held that the NCLT’s contrary interpretation was unduly restrictive and would impair the effective functioning of financial institutions. In support, the NCLAT relied on United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, underscoring that hyper-technical objections regarding authority should not frustrate substantive rights, especially where institutional authorisation frameworks are clear.
